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I. INTRODUCTION
David Baldus and his colleagues have conducted an extensive and
useful study of capital punishment decisionmaking in the state of Ne-
braska.1 Their research is a fine example of how empirical research
can be relevant to questions of law and policy. In determining
whether to have a system of capital punishment and, if so, how to
structure such a system, it is extremely useful to have data about vari-
ous aspects of how the existing system operates. The same can be said
for innumerable legal and policy issues ranging from various aspects
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Law & Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of Dispute
Resolution, University of Missouri School of Law. B.A. 1991, Willamette Univer-
sity; J.D. 1996, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; Ph.D. (Psychology) 1998, Univer-
sity of Nebraska-Lincoln. I appreciate the comments of David Baldus, Chris
Guthrie, Monica Johnson, Grant Robbennolt, Bob Schopp, and Rod Uphoff, the
research assistance of Jason Moore, Mitch Berry, and Josie Pottebaum, and the
financial support of the University of Missouri Law School Foundation.
1. David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of
the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience
(1973-1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486 (2002) [hereinafter Nebraska Study].
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of jury decisionmaking in both criminal and civil cases, 2 to eyewitness
identifications, 3 to inheritance policy,4 to affirmative action, 5 and to
contract law, 6 to mention just a few. Legislators routinely consider
issues that are informed by empirical research and judges are called
upon to act as gatekeepers who regulate the admissibility of scientific
evidence in court. 7
In any discussion of the relevance and usefulness of empirical re-
search in the law, there is, however, persistent tension between the
methods of social science and the theory, goals, and settings of law
and policy. As David Faigman notes,
A more vexing aspect of data collection for the law comes from the basic incon-
gruity between what scientists study and what the law is interested in know-
ing.... The law invariably relies on applied science, which typically involves
extrapolating from controlled laboratory tests that are highly artificial or gen-
eralizing from noncontrolled field tests that contain many confounding
variables.8
Using the study of capital punishment in Nebraska as a starting
point, the purpose of this paper is to explore more broadly the tensions
and tradeoffs at the intersection of social science methodology and the
law from the perspective of legal and policy decisionmakers who are
called upon to utilize empirical research. Those who use social scien-
tific research to inform the law must do more than distinguish "good"
research from "bad," they must also face the inevitable question of
how to appropriately use well-done, but inherently imperfect research,
for legal and policy purposes.
2. See generally Edith Greene et al., Jurors and Juries: A Review of the Field, in
TAKING PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, (J. Ogloff ed.,
2002); Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical
Perspective, 40 ARiz. L. REV. 849 (1998).
3. See generally Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recom-
mendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603 (1998);
Gary L. Wells, et al. From the Lab to the Police Station: A Successful Application
of Eyewitness Research, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 581 (2000).
4. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An
Empirical Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. 1 (1998); Monica K. Johnson & Jennifer K.
Robbennolt, Using Social Science to Inform the Law of Intestacy: The Case of Un-
married Committed Partners, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 479 (1998); Rita J. Simon
et al., Public Versus Statutory Choice of Heirs: A Study of Public Attitudes About
Property Distribution at Death, 58 Soc. FORCES 1263 (1980).
5. See, e.g., David L. Chambers et al., Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice:
The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 395 (2000).
6. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583
(1998); Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Con-
tract Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses
on Consumers' Propensity to Sue, 15 BEHAV. Sc. & L. 83 (1997).
7. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
8. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW
53 (1999).
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Toward this end, Part II uses empirical research on capital punish-
ment decisionmaking to illustrate the tension between methodological
concerns and legal theory or settings. The first example is drawn from
the recent study of capital punishment in Nebraska conducted by
Baldus and his colleagues and demonstrates a tension between meth-
odological concerns and legal theory. The second example draws on
experimental research that examines the effects of death qualifying
jurors and the comprehensibility of capital punishment penalty phase
jury instructions. This example highlights the tradeoff between real-
ism and experimental control, a tension inherent in social science re-
search that has implications for how empirical research is used in the
law. Part III identifies several obstacles to careful consideration of
these tensions and tradeoffs, and suggests that cognitive bias and a
lack of familiarity with the scientific method can interfere with evalu-
ations of the methodology of empirical research. Part IV suggests
ways of overcoming these obstacles in order to better achieve careful
consideration of the tensions and tradeoffs that exist at the intersec-
tion of law and methodology.
II. SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODS AND LEGAL QUESTIONS
There are any number of methodological approaches to addressing
research questions that have relevance for law and policy, each with
its own advantages and limitations. In considering the relevance of
empirical research for answering legal and policy questions, deci-
sionmakers ought to be concerned about several different aspects of
the research. For example, those evaluating empirical research
should be concerned that the measures used to quantify legal concepts
are sufficient to capture the construct at issue (construct validity),9
the degree to which the research design allows inferences to be drawn
about causal relationships between variables (internal validity),10 and
the degree to which the research findings can be generalized to per-
sons, times, and settings beyond those in which the research was con-
ducted (external validity).ll The following sections illustrate some of
the tensions between these methodological concerns and legal con-
cepts or settings.
9. THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN AND
ANALYSIS FOR FIELD SErrINGs 39, 59-64 (1979); see also Lee Epstein & Gary King,
The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 80-81 (2002) ("This means that our
comparisons and, ultimately, our answers to research questions are only as valid
as the measures we have developed. If those measures do not adequately mirror
the concepts contained in our theories, the conclusions we draw will be faulty.").
10. CooK & CAMPBELL, supra note 9, at 38.
11. Id. at 39.
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A. Archival Research - The Nebraska Death Penalty Study
The study of capital punishment in Nebraska recently conducted
by Baldus and his colleagues is an example of archival research in
which the researchers measure variables present in actual cases and
attempt to identify relationships between those variables. Archival
studies, such as this one, have the important benefit of high external
validity. That is, this study was able to examine decisions from real
cases in which judges and prosecutors were faced with rich case facts
and subtleties of evidence, and were required to make decisions about
sentences for real defendants. Archival research in which case char-
acteristics and decisions are carefully coded is extremely useful for
identifying patterns and associations between aspects of the cases and
the decisions that are made.12
Specifically, the study was largely concerned with the relationship
between culpability and sentencing outcomes. Thus, the study ex-
amined the disposition of death-eligible cases over a twenty-six year
period, measuring culpability primarily by looking at the record in
each case and coding "the strength of evidence of each of the statutory
aggravating and mitigating circumstances" in order to examine the
ways in which dispositions varied with culpability.13
In order to quantify different levels of the legally relevant concept
of case "culpability," some degree of abstraction is necessary; that is,
the concept of culpability must be operationalized so that it may be
measured. In measuring culpability, the study relied heavily on
counting the number of statutory aggravating and mitigating factors
in each case. 14 There are several good justifications for this approach.
While a wide variety of case characteristics could be and, in fact, were
coded, the small sample of capital cases in Nebraska precludes the use
of a large number of variables in the statistical analyses.15 Accord-
ingly, counting statutory aggravators and mitigators is a relatively
straightforward way in which to measure defendant culpability. Such
an approach is quantifiable, it is based on factors that the legislature
has deemed to be notably relevant case characteristics, and it likely
captures many of the case factors that are important to decisionmak-
12. For a discussion of archival research methods see generally Robert J. MacCoun,
Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About Decisionmaking
by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137 (Robert E.
Litan ed., 1993); Neil Vidmar, Making Inferences About Jury Behavior from Jury
Verdict Statistics: Cautions About the Lorelei's Lied, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 599
(1994).
13. Nebraska Study, supra note 1, at 532, app. A.
14. Id. at 534.
15. Id. at 535-36. There were only 185 prosecutions in death-eligible cases (covering
175 death-eligible defendants) over the period of the study. Id. at 541, 543.
[Vol. 81:777
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ing. Indeed, these measures appear to have had a high degree of pre-
dictive power.16
Nonetheless, these measures do not completely correspond to the
legal theory of capital punishment, which emphasizes individualized
assessment of each case. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the
decisionmaker is to make an "individualized decision" about whether
a particular defendant should be sentenced to death.17 In Woodson v.
North Carolina, the Court found that:
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and
record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense
excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the
possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse
frailties of humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a designated offense
not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undif-
ferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of
death.18
The Court concluded that, "in capital cases the fundamental respect
for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires considera-
tion of the character and record of the individual offender and the cir-
cumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."19
Consistent with this principle, the Court has held that the sentencer
must be able to consider, "as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defen-
dant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death."20
16. Id. at 550 ("The most significant factor explaining the pattern of capital charging
and sentencing outcomes in Nebraska is the number of statutory aggravating
circumstances in the cases.").
17. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) ("Given that the imposition of death by
public authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties, we cannot
avoid the conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital
cases."); see also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 78 (1987) ("[W]e conclude that
a departure from the individualized capital-sentencing doctrine is not justified
and cannot be reconciled with the demands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments."). Courts are expected to guide the discretion of the jury in conducting
this individualized assessment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., 153, 189 (1976)
("Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a mat-
ter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or
spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize
the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972).
18. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) ("[A] ... shortcoming of the
North Carolina statute is its failure to allow the particularized consideration of
relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before
the imposition upon him of a sentence of death."); see also Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. 325 (1976).
19. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
20. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. Moreover, "a statute that prevents the sentencer in all
capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defen-
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Nebraska law regarding capital sentencing is consistent with these
dictates. In particular, Nebraska Revised Statute section 29-2522 re-
quires that sentencing judges consider "[wihether sufficient aggravat-
ing circumstances exist to justify imposition of a sentence of death"
and "[wihether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which ap-
proach or exceed the weight given to the aggravating circum-
stances."2 1 In interpreting these statutory requirements, the
Nebraska Supreme Court has made it clear that the capital sentenc-
ing decision is to be based on an individualized evaluation of all of the
circumstances in the case, rather than on a process that simply counts
statutory aggravators and mitigators. In State v. Joubert, the court
stated:
Once the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances has been found
to exist, § 29-2522 requires not a mere counting of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances but, rather, a reasoned judgment as to what factual situations
require the imposition of death and which of those can be satisfied by life im-
prisonment in light of the totality of the circumstances present" 2 2
dant's character and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in miti-
gation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors
which may call for a less severe penalty." Id. at 605; see also Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112, 114 (1982) ("By holding that the sentencer in capi-
tal cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in
Lockett recognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual differences
is a false consistency."); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327-328 (1989) ("Indeed,
it is precisely because the punishment should be directly related to the personal
culpability of the defendant that the jury must be allowed to consider and give
effect to mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's character or record or the
circumstances of the offense.").
21. Nebraska Revised Statute section 29-2522 provides that:
After hearing all of the evidence and arguments in the sentencing pro-
ceeding, the judge or judges shall fix the sentence at either death or life
imprisonment, but such determination shall be based upon the following
considerations:
(1) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to justify imposi-
tion of a sentence of death;
(2) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which approach or
exceed the weight given to the aggravating circumstances; or
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the
defendant.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2522 (Reissue 1995). Statutory aggravating and mitigating
circumstances are listed in Nebraska Revised Statute section 29-2523. Ne-
braska's system of capital punishment differs from that of most states that have
such a system in that the judge or panel of judges is to determine the sentence,
rather than a jury. However, the United States Supreme Court has recently held
that capital defendants are entitled to have a jury determine any facts, such as
aggravating circumstances, that are "necessary for imposition of the death pen-
alty." Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
22. State v. Joubert, 224 Neb. 411, 425-26, 399 N.W.2d 237, 248 (1986) (emphasis
added); see also State v. Reeves, 239 Neb. 419, 476 N.W.2d 829 (1991); State v.
Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 551, 250 N.W.2d 881, 892-93 (1977) ("In the balancing of
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, we emphasize that a death pen-
[Vol. 81:777
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Toward this end, sentencing courts are "required to consider any
relevant evidence in mitigation," including mitigating circumstances
beyond those listed in the statute.23 Importantly, for present pur-
poses, such evidence would not be captured by a counting of statutory
mitigators.
Thus, it is clear that the legal conception of capital sentencing deci-
sionmaking contemplates individualized assessment of all of the facts
and circumstances in the case that are relevant to the offender's cul-
pability in order to determine whether a sentence of capital punish-
ment is appropriate. However, it would be methodologically difficult,
if not impossible, to measure "the totality of the circumstances" and
"any relevant evidence." This is the other side of the richness attend-
ant to archival research; each case has different facts and may present
qualitative differences or difficult to quantify subtleties that influence
prosecutorial or sentencing decisions. There may, then, be additional
factors that were not controlled for, or even coded, and these addi-
tional factors may confound the results obtained. 2 4 Accordingly, there
alty will not be imposed simply because the aggravating circumstances may out-
number the mitigating circumstances. Rather the test is whether the
aggravating circumstances in comparison outweigh the mitigating circum-
stances."); State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977). Judges inter-
viewed by Baldus and his colleagues expressed a view of the jurisprudence of
capital punishment consistent with this approach. The judges
completely rejected the suggestion that a 'rule of one' or any other quan-
titative standards were perceived to exist or were applied by either the
Nebraska Supreme Court or the trial courts. In stating this judgment
the former judges relied heavily on the language of the Nebraska Su-
preme Court that outcomes could not be based on mere counts, as well as
their belief that the sentencing courts meticulously adhered to this rule.
Nebraska Study, supra note 1, at 512.
23. State v. Victor, 235 Neb. 770, 457 N.W.2d 431 (1990); see also State v. Holtan, 205
Neb. 314, 287 N.W.2d 671 (1980) (noting that the court is not limited to consider-
ation of the mitigating factors listed in the statute, but shall consider "any matter
relevant to the imposition of the sentence and receive any such evidence which
the court deems to have probative value as to the character of the defendant").
24. For example, the researchers were unable to control for the presence or absence
of victim impact evidence (or the nature of such evidence). See Nebraska Study,
supra note 1, at 619. It may be difficult to code all possibly relevant variables, in
part, because "[t]o identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homi-
cides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these
characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the
sentencing authority [or a researcher doing coding], appear to be tasks which are
beyond present human ability." McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204
(1972). Thus, no system of measurement is likely to capture every relevant piece
of information. But, as Epstein and King note, "measurement allows us to put
many apparently disparate events or subjects on the same dimension, making it
far easier to comprehend at least one aspect of the phenomenon under study ....
Even more to the point, understanding the real world always requires a certain
level of abstraction, and so measurement of some kind plays a central role in
empirical research. The key is that we abstract the right dimensions for our pur-
poses, and that we measure enough dimensions of each subject to capture all the
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
is not a precise one-to-one correspondence between the measures used
and the requirements of the law.
Given the difficulties posed by potentially uncontrolled variables
and the lack of precise correspondence with the jurisprudence of capi-
tal sentencing inherent in this type of archival research, we should not
uncritically accept the results of the study at face value as exactly
measuring everything that a decisionmaker takes into account in
making a decision. It is clear that they do not. There are a host of
variables, both legal and extra-legal that may influence decisions re-
garding offender culpability or sentencing (e.g., details of the crime,
aspects of the defendant's character, juror attitudes and affective re-
sponses, attorney argument styles, and reactions of the local
community).25
Conversely, however, given the advantages of archival research,
neither should we uncritically reject the results for this lack of precise
correspondence. 2 6 It may not be the case that this lack of correspon-
dence systematically influences the pattern of results.2 7 For this rea-
son, the results of the study of capital punishment in Nebraska
provide an extremely useful look at both prosecutorial and judicial
decisionmaking in capital cases, demonstrate a number of interesting
relationships between defendant culpability and decisionmaking, and
suggest several ways in which arbitrariness exists in the system.28
parts that are essential to our research question." Epstein & King, supra note 9,
at 81.
25. See Richard Weiner, Death Penalty Research in Nebraska: How Do Judges and
Juries Reach Penalty Decisions?, 81 NEB. L. REV. 757, 760 (2002). One study of
prosecutors' closing arguments in the penalty phase of capital trials demon-
strated that prosecutors tend to focus more on the moral and emotional aspects of
the case in their arguments than on aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
D. D. Logan, Why You Should Not Kill This Man, presented at the British Psy-
chological Society's International Conference on Psychology and Law, Swansea,
Wales, described in Valerie P. Hans, Death By Jury in CHALLENGING CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES (Kenneth C. Haas &
James A. Inciardi eds., 1988) ("Although it was also typical for prosecutors to
state that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circum-
stances, the overall pattern of their arguments in the penalty phase suggested
that they perceived the emotional dimensions of the decision to be paramount.").
26. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Instructing on Death: Psychologists, Juries, and
Judges, 48 Am. PSYCHOL. 423, 430-31 (1993) (noting that the possibility of unmea-
sured variables "offers a convenient rationale for discounting the results of such
an archival analysis to an audience that may not be inclined to acknowledge the
existence of undependable decisionmaking in capital cases").
27. See infra section IV.A.
28. See Nebraska Study, supra note 1.
[Vol. 81:777
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B. Experimental Research - Death Qualification and
Penalty Phase Instructions
A second type of tension that has implications for how empirical
research is used in law involves a tradeoff between the ability to con-
trol and manipulate variables that are of interest and the degree to
which the research setting reflects the relevant legal conditions (that
is, the verisimilitude of the study). An example of this tension comes
from a growing body of experimental research examining the factors
that influence capital sentencing. In a typical experiment, a large
number of participants evaluate the same simulated case.2 9 All char-
acteristics of the case (the details of the crime, the backgrounds and
characteristics of the defendant and victim, etc.) are held constant; the
only attribute varied is the characteristic or procedure of interest.
Thus, observed differences in responses, such as sentencing decisions,
can be attributed to the variable of interest, unconfounded by other
influences. Simulation methodology allows isolation of specific vari-
ables, permits observation of deliberation processes, and allows exper-
imental manipulation of legal rules and procedures as well as case and
party characteristics. 30
Experimental methodology has been usefully employed to examine
a number of aspects of capital case decisionmaking-only two of which
will I note here. First, a number of experiments have been conducted
to explore the effects of death qualifying jurors in capital cases. 3 1
29. In this context, I will focus primarily on jury simulation studies. Field experi-
ments, in which trial features of interest are systematically manipulated within
actual trials, may also be conducted. See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans et al., The Arizona
Jury Reform Permitting Civil Jury Trial Discussions: The Views of Trial Partici-
pants, Judges, and Jurors, 32 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 349 (1999); Larry Heuer &
Steven D. Penrod, Increasing Jurors' Participation in Trials: A Field Experiment
with Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231 (1988);
Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment with
Written and Preliminary Instructions, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 409 (1989). Field
experiments may be feasible in some circumstances with the cooperation of the
court (e.g., examinations of juror notetaking), but may not be possible in others
(e.g., plaintiff or defendant characteristics).
30. For discussion of simulation research, see generally Brian H. Bornstein, The Eco-
logical Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out? 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 75 (1999); Robert M. Bray & Norbert L. Kerr, Use of the Simulation
Method in the Study of Jury Behavior: Some Methodological Considerations, 3
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 107, 117 (1979); Shari Seidman Diamond, Illuminations and
Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561 (1997); MacCoun,
supra note 12; Wayne Weiten & Shari Seidman Diamond, A Critical Review of the
Jury Simulation Paradigm: The Case of Defendant Characteristics, 3 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 71, 75-83 (1979); see also Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism
Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of
Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002).
31. Brooke M. Butler & Gary Moran, The Role of Death Qualification in Venireper-
sons' Evaluations of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Tri-
als, 26 LAw & HUM BEHAv. 175 (2002); C. L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Briefly, in capital cases jurors are screened for their attitudes toward
capital punishment and may be constitutionally disqualified from jury
service if their attitudes would "prevent or substantially impair the
performance of [their] duties as a juror in accordance with [their] in-
structions and oath";32 the resulting jury is said to be "death quali-
fied." Experimental studies in this area typically compare jurors or
juries who have been death qualified with those who have not in their
verdicts and other judgments in response to a simulated case. These
studies have generally demonstrated that juries that have been death
qualified tend to be more conviction prone than are juries that have
not been so qualified. 33
Second, there have been a number of studies investigating the
comprehensibility of penalty phase jury instructions in capital
cases. 3 4 In these studies, lay decisionmakers are asked to read or lis-
Qualification on Jurors' Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Delibera-
tion, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984); Pheobe C. Ellsworth et al., The Death-
Qualified Jury and the Defense of Insanity, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 81 (1984);
Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-
Qualification Process, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984).
32. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 852 (1985); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510 (1968); Hovey v. Superior Court, 616 P.2d 1301 (Cal. 1980).
33. See M. T. Nietzel et al., Juries: The Current State of the Empirical Literature, in
PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 23-52 (R. Roesch et al. eds.,
1999), for a meta-analytic review (finding a small but reliable correlation be-
tween death penalty attitudes and verdict). See, e.g., Butler & Moran, supra note
31; Cowan et al., supra note 31. A number of studies have explored the reasons
why death-qualified juries might be more conviction prone, finding evidence that
death-qualified jurors differ from "excludables" demographically as well as in
their attitudes toward crime control and due process, and in their attitudes to-
ward the prosecution and defense, see, e.g., Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe Ells-
worth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1984), that they differ in how they interpret evidence,
see, e.g., William C. Thompson et al., Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction
Proneness: The Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 95
(1984), that they differ in how they evaluate aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, see, e.g., Butler & Moran, supra note 31, and that exposure to voir dire
that includes a death qualification process leads to more conviction proneness,
see, e.g., , Haney, supra note 31; Craig Haney, Examining Death Qualification:
Further Analysis of the Process Effect, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 133 (1984); see also
Craig Haney, Aida Hurtado, & Luis Vega, "Modern" Death Qualification: New
Data on its Biasing Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 619 (1995).
34. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, supra note 26; Shari Seidman Diamond &
Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by Revising and Testing Jury In-
structions, 79 JUDICATURE 224 (1996); Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Compre-
hending Life and Death Matters: A Preliminary Study of California's Capital
Penalty Instructions, 18 LAW & Hum. BEHAv. 411 (1994) [hereinafter Haney &
Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death]; Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Clarifying
Life and Death Matters: An Analysis of Instructional Comprehension and Penalty
Phase Closing Arguments, 21 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 575 (1997) [hereinafter Haney
& Lynch, Clarifying Life and Death]; James Luginbuhl, Comprehension of
Judges' Instructions in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Trial, 16 LAW & HUM.
[Vol. 81:777
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ten to a set of jury instructions and to respond to questions designed to
assess their comprehension of the instructions. In general, this re-
search has documented that capital case penalty phase instructions
are not well comprehended by jurors.3 5 In particular, lay deci-
sionmakers have difficulty understanding the concepts of aggravation
and mitigation, particularly mitigation, and even misconstrue individ-
ual factors as falling in the opposite category. 36 Moreover, a number
of studies have demonstrated that participants' level of understanding
of the instructions influences their use of the evidence and their sen-
tencing decisions. 37
Concerns about experimental methods, such as the methods used
in the studies just described, typically center around the external va-
lidity of the simulations, that is, the degree to which the effects ob-
served generalize to the actual trial setting. Because field
experiments are often not feasible, experimental simulations are con-
ducted in the laboratory with varying degrees of verisimilitude (i.e.,
ecological validity). The participants range from college students in
some studies to jury-eligible community members in others, compre-
hension of instructions may or may not be assessed in the context of a
simulated penalty phase trial, case materials may be provided in writ-
ten form or via audio or videotape, and so on. In order to gain control
of specific variables of interest, some degree of realism is sacrificed.
BEHAV. 203 (1992); Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination and Instruc-
tional Comprehension: Guided Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty, 24
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 337 (2000); Richard L. Wiener et al., The Role of Declarative
and Procedural Knowledge in Capital Murder Sentencing, 28 J. APPLIED Soc.
PSYCHOL. 124 (1998) [hereinafter Wiener et al., Capital Murder Sentencing];
Richard L. Wiener et al., Comprehensibility of Approved Jury Instructions in
Capital Murder Cases, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 455 (1995) [hereinafter Wiener et
al., Comprehensibility]. See generally, Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionaries and
Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1. For psy-
chological research on jury instructions see generally AmiRAM ELWORK ET AL.,
MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982) (jury instructions on negli-
gence); Amiram Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in
Light of It, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 163 (1977) (jury instructions on negligence);
Vicky L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the
Law, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 507 (1993); Vicky L. Smith, Prototypes in the Court-
room: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
857 (1991). For reviews see Peter English & Bruce Sales, A Ceiling or Consis-
tency Effect for the Comprehension of Jury Instructions, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 381 (1997); Joel Lieberman & Bruce Sales, What Social Psychology Teaches Us
About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 589 (1997).
35. See Haney & Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death, supra note 34; Haney &
Lynch, Clarifying Life and Death, supra note 34; Lynch & Haney, supra note 34;
Weiner et al., Comprehensibility, supra note 34; Weiner et al., Capital Murder
Sentencing, supra note 34.
36. Id.
37. See Lynch & Haney, supra note 34; Weiner et al., Comprehensibility, supra note
34; Weiner et al., Capital Murder Sentencing, supra note 34.
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Therefore, it is inevitable that an experimental simulation will not
precisely match all the conditions of the relevant legal situation.
While decisionmakers are (or ought to be) concerned primarily
with the external validity or generalizability of the research findings,
they often focus on the verisimilitude of a study as a proxy for external
validity or as a convenient way in which to dismiss the research.
38
Indeed, a representativeness heuristic may operate such that deci-
sionmakers discount the usefulness of research that does not precisely
match the legal context. 39 Thus, courts have rejected empirical stud-
ies that do not mirror the trial setting. In Lockhart v. McCree, the
Court rejected several studies of death qualification because the par-
ticipants "were not actual jurors sworn under oath to apply the law to
the facts of an actual case involving the fate of an actual capital defen-
dant.' 40 Courts have also rejected empirical studies of the compre-
hensibility of capital phase jury instructions on similar grounds.4 1
However, it is not necessary that a study mirror the conditions of
an actual trial for the study to have high external validity and for it to
be useful in a legal or policy context. An experimental simulation
might be a relatively bare-boned approximation of a particular legal
setting, but if it evokes behavior similar to, or consistently predictive
of, that exhibited in the real world, the research has a high degree of
generalizability. For example, Lynch and Haney investigated the cap-
ital case penalty phase instruction comprehension of jury-eligible com-
munity members and found a "pattern of errors [that] was strikingly
38. For discussions of the ecological validity of simulation studies see Bray & Kerr,
supra note 30; Diamond, supra note 30; Weiten & Diamond, supra note 30.
39. See Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Reasoning About Scientific Evidence: Effects of
Juror Gender and Evidence Quality on Juror Decisions in a Hostile Work Envi-
ronment Case, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 362 (1999). Using the representativeness
heuristic, decisionmakers make categorizations based on the degree to which the
object of the evaluation is representative of the category to the neglect of other
relevant considerations. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Belief
in the Law of Small Numbers, 76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 110 (1971).
40. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 171 (1986). See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Unpleas-
ant Facts: The Supreme Court's Response to Empirical Research on Capital Pun-
ishment, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
APPROACHES (Kenneth C. Haas & James A Inciardi, eds., 1988), for a detailed
discussion of the criticisms of the empirical research in the Lockhart opinion.
41. For example, the court in State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 542 (Mo. 1999), stated:
Dr. Weiner's [sic] study, however, must be discounted because the people
interviewed for the study did not act as jurors. They were given hypo-
thetical facts that were different than the facts in this case, and they did
not hear the testimony of witnesses, observe physical evidence or delib-
erate with eleven other jurors. More importantly, in the context of the
instructions as a whole, the term 'mitigating' is always contrasted with
the term 'aggravating' so that no reasonable person could fail to under-
stand that 'mitigating' is the opposite of 'aggravating.'
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similar to, and in most respects worse than, the ones ... obtained in
earlier studies using college student subjects."42
Thus, just as with archival research, there are disadvantages of
simulation research that suggest that one should not uncritically ac-
cept the results of such studies at face value as representing exactly
how jurors or judges make decisions in real contexts. Those evaluat-
ing the research ought to be aware of the potential effects of a lack of
one-to-one correspondence between the simulation method used and
the conditions of the actual legal decisions. Conversely, however,
neither should one uncritically reject the results because the simula-
tion did not exactly match the conditions in the real world. Experi-
mental research provides useful information about how people make
decisions, understand instructions and evidence, and respond to dif-
ferences in a variety of contextual factors.
III. OBSTACLES TO EVALUATING
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
Even from these brief examples, it should be fairly clear that any
individual empirical study will inevitably have some drawbacks as
well as some advantages. Experimental research emphasizes control
at the expense of realism, while archival research has the advantage
of realism at the expense of tight control.43 Of concern, however, is
42. Lynch & Haney, supra note 34, at 346; see also Bornstein, supra note 30 (review-
ing jury simulation research comparing types of participants and methods of trial
presentation and finding few differences in study results).
43. For purposes of simplicity, I have focused here on the broad distinction between
archival and experimental research, but the same is true for other empirical
methods. For instance, valuable information can be obtained from interviewing
participants in capital cases such as jurors and judges. Indeed, interviewing ju-
rors is the approach that has been taken by the Capital Jury Project. See, e.g.,
William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of
Early Findings, 70 IND. L. J. 1043 (1995); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells,
Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1993); James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instruc-
tions: Guided or Misguided? 70 IND. L. J. 1161 (1995). The advantage of such an
approach is that the information is obtained directly from the people who heard
the evidence and made the decisions and who can speak to what they reacted to
or thought was important. See Diamond, supra note 26, at 431. However, par-
ticipants' reports are subject to a host of potential perceptual and memory errors;
research in psychology has demonstrated that people are not always able to re-
port the bases for their decisions and that their perceptions and memories can
change once they have made a decision. See generally, RICHARD NIsBETr & LEE
Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT
(1980); J.W. Brehm, Postdecision Changes in the Desirability of Alternatives, J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 384 (1956); E. Greene, Whodunit? Memory for Evi-
dence in Text, 94 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 479 (1981); Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D.
Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84
PSYCHOL. REV. 231 (1977).
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the inclination of many consumers of social science data to disregard
these nuances of methodology, look at studies in isolation, and to ei-
ther accept their results at face value as providing the answers to dif-
ficult legal or policy problems or, alternatively, to reject the results out
of hand because the study did not account for every conceivable varia-
ble, did not perfectly mirror legal conditions, or did not measure legal
variables in ways that perfectly capture the law. It would be more
useful, however, for such consumers to engage in a more systematic
consideration of these tensions and tradeoffs, rather than to merely
conduct such a casual consideration of the relationship between re-
search methods and legal or policy concerns.44
While it would be ideal for consumers of social science data to en-
gage in careful review of policy relevant to empirical research, there
are obstacles to accomplishing this thorough consideration of studies,
methods, and legal relevance. First, psychological research has
demonstrated that whether one uncritically rejects an empirical study
out of hand or uncritically accepts it at face value is not a random
process, but can be determined by cognitive and motivational biases.
Second, many observers lack the background in research methodology
that would facilitate more systematic thinking about these tensions.
A. Biased Assimilation
First, the phenomenon of biased assimilation has "troubling impli-
cations for efforts to ground contemporary policy debates in empirical
analysis."45 Biased assimilation is the tendency for evaluations of the
methodology and persuasiveness of empirical research to be influ-
enced by the extent to which the results of the research are consistent
with the attitudes or expectations of the person doing the evalua-
tion.4 6 Thus, "judgments about the validity, reliability, relevance, and
sometimes even the meaning of proffered evidence are biased by the
apparent consistency of that evidence with the perceiver's theories
and expectations." 47
In the paradigmatic study of biased assimilation, Lord, Ross, and
Lepper examined how people evaluated empirical research related to
capital punishment and its deterrence of crime.48 Specifically, they
examined the "consequences of introducing the opposing factions to
44. See infra section IV.A.
45. Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research Results, 49
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 259, 267 (1998).
46. See Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross, & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Atti-
tude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evi-
dence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979).
47. Id. at 2099.
48. Id.
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relevant and objective data."4 9 Participants who either favored capi-
tal punishment and believed it to have a deterrent effect or who op-
posed capital punishment and questioned its deterrent effect were
recruited to participate in the study. Participants were asked to eval-
uate two empirical studies of the deterrent effect of capital punish-
ment, one study described as finding an effect and the other described
as failing to find such evidence. Thus, each participant read about one
study that corroborated their initial beliefs about capital punishment
and deterrence and one that refuted these beliefs. For each study,
participants were given a description of the procedures used in the
study, the results, a set of criticisms, and a rebuttal. For half of the
participants, the study described as finding a deterrent effect was de-
scribed as using a longitudinal methodology and the study finding no
deterrent effect was described as using a cross-sectional methodol-
ogy. 50 For the other participants, the methodologies of the studies
were described in the opposite manner. Participants were asked to
rate the methodology of each study as well as its persuasiveness.
Studies described as having results that were consistent with the
participants' prior beliefs were rated as having higher methodological
quality and as being more convincing than were studies described as
having results that contradicted these prior beliefs, regardless of
which methodology was described. Thus, participants who favored
capital punishment and believed it to have a deterrent effect, found
the prodeterrence study to be of higher quality and persuasiveness
than the antideterrence study and vice versa. 51 Thus, the identical
methodologies were evaluated differently depending on whether they
produced findings that were consistent with the evaluators' prior atti-
tudes and beliefs. Lord, Ross, and Lepper concluded that "[slubjects'
decisions about whether to accept a study's findings at face value or to
search for flaws and entertain alternative interpretations seemed to
depend far less on the particular procedure employed than on whether
the study's results coincided with their existing beliefs."52
The basic phenomenon of biased assimilation has been widely rep-
licated using different populations of evaluators and a variety of re-
search topic areas. 53 Importantly, for present purposes, Redding and
49. Id. at 2098.
50. The longitudinal study was described as involving a comparison of homicide rates
in a number of states before and after each state adopted a system of capital
punishment. The cross-sectional study was described as involving a comparison
of homicide rates across states with and without capital punishment. Id. at 2100.
51. Id. at 2102.
52. Id. at 2106.
53. See, e.g., Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differen-
tial Decision Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J. PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 568 (1992) (undergraduate students evaluating medical
testing); Kari Edwards & Edward E. Smith, A Disconfirmation Bias in the Evalu-
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Reppucci found a pattern of biased assimilation for state court judges
and law students who were asked to make judgments about social sci-
ence research on capital punishment and deterrence. 54 The results of
the empirical studies that were presented to the U.S. Supreme Court
in Furman v. Georgia55 were varied so that they either supported or
failed to support the death penalty. Participants judged the research
to be more relevant to the legal issues, more likely to be admissible,
and to have greater dispositive weight when the results were consis-
tent with their personal attitudes about the death penalty than when
the results contradicted those attitudes. 56
Koehler extended the examination of biased assimilation to addi-
tional content areas and to more highly skilled evaluators, finding a
pattern of results similar to that of Lord, Ross, and Lepper.5 7 In one
study, Koehler asked participants, who were graduate students in the
natural and social sciences, to read summaries of two fictitious scien-
tific controversies that were designed to induce prior beliefs about the
hypotheses at issue. Participants were then asked to evaluate re-
search reports related to the two issues for their relevance, method-
ological quality, and clarity.5 8 Most participants endorsed the
scientific norm that the outcome of the studies should not influence
their judgments and reported that the outcome did not influence their
ation of Arguments, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1996) (undergraduate
students evaluating a variety of arguments); Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence
of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of Evidence Quality, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28 (1993) (graduate students and scientists
evaluating fictional scientific controversy and research on ESP); Charles G. Lord
et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231 (1984) (undergraduate students); Michael J.
Mahoney, Publication Prejudices: An Experimental Study of Confirmatory Bias in
the Peer Review System, 1 COGNITIVE THERAPY & RES. 161 (1977) (journal review-
ers evaluating research on behaviorism); Geoffrey D. Munro & Peter H. Ditto,
Biased Assimilation, Attitude Polarization, and Affect in Reactions to Stereotype-
Relevant Scientific Information, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 636
(1997) (undergraduate students evaluating research on homosexuality); Geoffrey
D. Munro et al., Biased Assimilation of Sociopolitical Arguments: Evaluating the
U.S. Presidential Debate, 24 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 15 (2002) (under-
graduate students evaluating arguments made in a political debate); S. Plous,
Biases in the Assimilation of Technological Breakdowns: Do Accidents Make Us
Safer? 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1058 (1991) (students, ROTC cadets, and
staff of 2 peace organizations evaluating technological breakdowns).
54. Richard E. Redding & N. D. Reppucci, Effects of Lawyers' Socio-political Attitudes
on Their Judgments of Social Science in Legal Decision Making, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 31 (1999).
55. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
56. Redding & Reppucci, supra note 54, at 43. The effects were more pervasive for
law students (evident in four different ratings) than for judges (evident in ratings
of dispositive weight only). Id. at 44. Biased assimilation was not found for eval-
uations of research as to predictions of future violence by psychologists. Id. at 46.
57. Koehler, supra note 53.
58. Id. at 35-36.
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judgments. 5 9 Nonetheless, participants gave more positive evalua-
tions to the reports with findings that were consistent with their in-
duced expectations than to those that were inconsistent with these
expectations. 60
Research replicating the biased assimilation effect and extending
the work to explore the mechanisms underlying the effect has demon-
strated both motivational and cognitive influences. 6 1 There is evi-
dence that biased assimilation effects are mediated by the different
affective responses that evaluators have to attitude-congruent and at-
titude-inconsistent research results. 6 2 Other researchers have fo-
59. Id. at 38-39. A majority of participants (64%) indicated that their judgments
were not influenced by the outcome of the studies (24% indicated that they were
influenced; 10% were not sure) and an ever larger majority (83%) indicated that
such judgments should not depend on outcome (12% thought should; 5% not
sure). Id. Moreover, "tihose who believed that the outcome of the study did not
influence their quality judgments were actually influenced by the outcome as
much as those who admitted some probable influence." Id.
60. Id. at 37. In a second study, participants, scientists with opposing views on the
controversy over extrasensory perception (ESP), were asked to evaluate a re-
search report describing an ESP study. The study was of either high or low meth-
odological quality, and the results were described as supporting ESP, refuting
ESP, or no results were described. Id. at 41. Again, despite the fact that most
participants reported that they were not (and should not be) influenced in their
evaluations by the outcomes of the studies, participants gave more favorable
evaluations of the relevance, methodological quality, and clarity of studies that
reported results consistent with their prior beliefs on the issue. Id. at 44. That
is, parapsycholgists gave more positive evaluations to studies with results sup-
portive of ESP and "skeptics" gave more positive evaluations to studies with dis-
confirming results. See also Mahoney, supra note 53 (finding biased assimilation
in scientific journal reviewers).
61. To say that the bias is "motivated" is not to say that it is intentional. See Mac-
Coun, supra note 45 ("Motivation is shorthand for the degree to which the bias
has its origins in the judge's preferences, goals, or values; intentional bias is moti-
vated, but not all motivated biases are intentional."). While biased interpretation
of empirical research may be intentional in some cases, see generally MacCoun,
supra note 45 (discussing fraud and advocacy as sources of bias); Shari Seidman
Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Empirical Evidence and the Death Penalty, 50 J.
Soc. ISSUES 177 (1994) (discussing reasons why the Court might be resistant to
empirical research on capital punishment); Michael J. Saks, Social Psychological
Contributions to a Legislative Subcommittee on Organ and Tissue Transplants,
33 Am. PSYCHOL. 680 (1978) ("These decision makers usually have looked to 'em-
pirical research' not as a source of knowledge that will guide them to an informed
conclusion but as a hook on which to hang their presuppositions."), it is uninten-
tional bias that is primarily the focus of my remarks.
62. See, e.g., Munro & Ditto, supra note 53. Munro and Ditto found that participants
who held highly prejudicial views about homosexuality evaluated studies report-
ing results consistent with negative stereotypes about homosexuality as being of
higher methodological quality than studies that used the same methods but re-
ported stereotype-inconsistent results. These high prejudice participants also re-
ported feeling more negative emotion after reading the non-stereotypical results
and more positive emotion after reading the stereotypical results. Conversely,
participants low in prejudice found studies with non-stereotypic results to be
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cused on differences in the cognitive processes used to evaluate
attitude-congruent and attitude-inconsistent information. The find-
ings generally suggest that evaluators engage in a truncated evalua-
tion process in response to results that are consistent with their
attitudes, expectations, or theories-essentially being more willing to
accept the results at face value. On the other hand, when evaluating
information that disconfirms one's theory or expectations or that is
not preferred, evaluators appear to spend more time considering alter-
native hypotheses, 6 3 expend more cognitive effort,6 4 require more in-
formation to make a decision, 65 generate and consider more
arguments (with higher proportions of them being refutational and re-
dundant), 66 and display increased sensitivity to the quality of the in-
formation.6 7 Evaluators may also have an overall "propensity to
remember the strengths of confirming evidence but the weaknesses of
disconfirming evidence." 68 Hence, Lord, Ross, and Lepper note:
With confirming evidence, we suspect that both lay and professional scientists
rapidly reduce the complexity of the information and remember only a few
well-chosen supportive impressions. With disconfirming evidence, they con-
tinue to reflect upon any information that suggests less damaging 'alternative
interpretation.' 6 9
Thus, there appear to be parallel tendencies to accept empirical
results that confirm previously held attitudes or expectations at face
value and to look for ways to reject out of hand results that disconfirm
or conflict with those expectations or attitudes. Importantly, neither
of these tendencies is likely to be the most useful approach for evalu-
ating empirical studies for use in legal or policy decisionmaking.
more methodologically sound than those using identical methods but reporting
stereotypic results. These participants reported more negative emotion associ-
ated with the stereotypical results and more positive emotion associated with the
non-stereotypical results. Id. at 641-46. Further analyses demonstrated that
participants prior beliefs (i.e., prejudice) influenced their affective reactions to
the studies described and that these affective reactions, in turn, influenced par-
ticipants' methodological evaluations. Id. at 643 (study 1), 647 (study 2); see also
Edwards & Smith, supra note 53, at 16 (finding larger effects for those high in
emotional conviction).
63. Ditto & Lopez, supra note 53, at 575; Edwards & Smith, supra note 53, at 10.
64. Peter H. Ditto et al., Motivated Sensitivity to Preference-Inconsistent Information,
75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53 (1998) (using cognitive load manipulation)
65. Ditto & Lopez, supra note 53, at 573.
66. Edwards & Smith, supra note 53, at 10, 12 (study 1), 17 (study 2); Ditto & Lopez,
supra note 53, at 578 (citing more test-affecting irregularities if against
preference).
67. Ditto et al., supra note 64, at 64.
68. Lord, Ross, & Lepper, supra note 46, at 2099.
69. Id. at 2099.
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B. Methodological Background
A second major obstacle that prevents careful consideration of em-
pirical research stems from the fact that many participants in the le-
gal system, such as judges and legislators, who are called upon to
evaluate empirical data, lack the background in science, empirical re-
search methodology, and statistics that would facilitate a nuanced
evaluation of social scientific evidence. As Faigman notes:
Further complicating the law's use of science, legal consumers of scientific re-
search often have little understanding of the product they are buying. In most
areas of the law, those using science have little or no training in the subject.
This is true for judges, jurors, legislators, and to a lesser extent, administra-
tors. All judges and most legislators and administrators come from the ranks
of lawyers. . . .Fewer than 10 percent of all students attending law school
have undergraduate degrees in fields that require substantial math and sci-
ence training .... Not only do they not have training in the particular sub-
ject, they have a more profound disability: most lawyers have little or no
appreciation for the scientific method and lack the ability to judge whether
proffered research is good science, bad science, or science at all.
7 0
Not only do most law students not come from scientific back-
grounds, but (notwithstanding some exceptions) legal education has
also not tended to provide training in empirical research methods or
statistics.7 1 Lehman, Lempert, and Nisbett compared the statistical
and methodological reasoning of graduate students in a variety of dis-
ciplines. 72 They found that despite few initial differences across disci-
plines, students in psychology and medicine improved dramatically in
their ability to engage in statistical-methodological reasoning in the
first three years of graduate school, while students in law did not.
73
The impact of this lack of background in the scientific method can
have important implications for the evaluation and application of em-
pirical research. Research into dual process models of persuasion sug-
gests that not only must an observer be motivated to engage in careful
and effortful processing of a message, but the observer must also have
70. FAIGMAN, supra note 8, at 53-54. "[O]f the 535 members of the United States
Congress, fewer than 1 percent have any significant training in science. Today,
the route to being a 'statesman' is through law or business." Id. at 123.
71. See Epstein & King, supra note 9 (arguing that law schools ought to teach statis-
tics/scientific methodology); Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical,
26 PEPP. L. REV. 807 (1999).
72. Darrin R. Lehman et al., The Effects of Graduate Training on Reasoning: Formal
Discipline and Thinking About Everyday-Life Events, 43 AM. PSYCHOL. 431
(1988).
73. Id. at 437. "Training in the law does not stress rules for dealing with variability
or uncertainty in causal relations, and so it is not surprising that it produces no
improvement in the ability to apply the statistical and methodological rules of the
probabilistic sciences to either scientific studies or everyday-life events." Id. at
440.
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the ability to engage in such processing.7 4 Accordingly, one who is
called upon to evaluate an empirical study for use in the legal or policy
arena can only engage in a careful consideration of the implications of
methodological choices if he or she has the ability to do so. Absent
some background in empirical research methodology that enables a
more nuanced consideration, one is more likely to fall back on less sys-
tematic heuristic processing.7 5 Thus, one may be more likely to react
to a piece of research in a way that is consistent with one's prior expec-
tations or attitudes than to carefully consider how the methodological
and legal tensions play out in the particular instance.
Recent research provides evidence that attorneys, judges, and ju-
rors have difficulty assessing empirical research methodology and are
not sensitive to differences in methodological quality. 76 Kovera, Mc-
Auliff, and Hebert presented jurors with one of several different de-
scriptions of a study of sexual harassment and its methodology in the
context of a civil trial. They found that jurors' assessments of the
study were not sensitive to differences in how sexual harassment was
measured. 77 In another experimental study, Kovera and McAuliff
found that methodological flaws in a study of sexual harassment did
74. See RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION:
CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE (1986); Shelley S.
Chaiken et al., Heuristic and Systematic Processing Within and Beyond the Per-
suasion Context, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 212 (J.S. Uleman et al. eds., 1989).
75. See, e.g., Joel Cooper et al., Complex Scientific Testimony: How Do Jurors Make
Decisions? 20 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 379 (1996) (noting how an expert's credentials
had an effect on juror judgements when the expert's testimony was complex, but
not when the testimony was easily understood); Kovera et al., supra note 39, at
372 (finding that jurors "relied on heiristic cues when evaluating the validity of
scientific evidence," specifically the research's general acceptance and its ecologi-
cal validity).
76. Margaret Bull Kovera & Bradley D. McAuliff, The Effects of Peer Review and
Evidence Quality on Judge Evaluations of Psychological Science: Are Judges Ef-
fective Gatekeepers?, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 574 (2000); Kovera et al., supra note
39; Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Assessment of the Commonsense Psychology Un-
derlying Daubert: Legal Decision Makers'Abilities to Evaluate Expert Evidence in
Hostile Work Environment Cases, PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. (forthcoming 2002)
(citing unpublished studies). There is also a corpus of evidence that laypeople in
general have difficulty with statistical reasoning and with identifying flaws in
empirical research. See, e.g., RICHARD E. NISBETr, RULES FOR REASONING (Rich-
ard E. Nisbett ed., 1993); Christopher C. Jepson et al., Inductive Reasoning: Com-
petence or Skill?, 6 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 494 (1983); Richard E. Nisbett et al.,
Teaching Reasoning, 238 SCIENCE 625 (1987); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE
1124 (1974) (sample sizes).
77. See Kovera et al., supra note 39, at 372. They compared a version in which sex-
ual harassment was measured by a single confederate's rating of participants'
sexual motivation to a version in which several other measures of sexual harass-
ment were used (e.g., how close he sat, how many inappropriate questions, his
evaluations of her qualifications) in addition to the confederate's rating. Id. at
367.
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not significantly influence trial court judges' decisions about the ad-
missibility of the study as evidence. 78 In a similar study of a national
sample of attorneys, Kovera and McAuliff found that attorneys' rat-
ings of the scientific quality of the study at issue were not influenced
by flaws in the research method, and their reported cross-examination
strategies were relatively unlikely to include issues related to these
flaws.7 9
In order for empirical research to be optimally used to inform legal
and policy decisionmaking, those called upon to evaluate the research
and its implications must be able to identify the tensions between
methods and legal theory and to appraise them. While a background
in scientific methodology may not be sufficient to eliminate biased as-
similation,80 a basic grounding in the methods of social science is es-
sential to a nuanced understanding of the implications of
methodological choices. Those without a basic understanding of meth-
ods will be less likely to be able to identify the benefits of a particular
methodological approach and will not be attuned to the drawbacks of
the approach. Accordingly, they are less likely to be able to engage in
a critical evaluation of the interplay between the research methodol-
ogy and the legal or policy setting.
IV. STRATEGIES FOR EVALUATING EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
It is inevitable that there will be some tension between the stric-
tures of the empirical methodologies employed to study legal or policy
questions and the legal theory or setting. But, while there are obsta-
cles to a sophisticated examination of these tensions, these obstacles
are not inevitably insurmountable. Decisionmakers can attempt to
self-consciously analyze the implications of a particular tension for the
specific legal or policy setting. In addition, decisionmakers can en-
deavor to read and understand empirical research in the context of
other relevant studies that are designed to address the same compli-
78. Kovera & McAuliff, supra note 76, at 580. In addition, very few judges mentioned
internal validity threats (confound (13%), non-blind research assistant (9%),
missing control group (8%)) when justifying their admissibility decisions. Id. at
581. These findings are particularly troubling given trial judges are now ex-
pected to act as gatekeepers and determine the reliability of scientific evidence.
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 n.7 (1993).
79. Margaret Bull Kovera & Bradley D. McAuliff, Attorneys' Evaluations of Psycho-
logical Science: Does Evidence Quality Matter? (2002) (unpublished manuscript
on file with the author), described in Kovera, Russano, & McAuliff, supra note 76.
Social psychologists, on the other hand were sensitive to the differences in the
methodological quality of the different descriptions of the study. See M. B. Rus-
sano & Margaret Bull Kovera, Psychologists' Evaluations of Valid and Flawed
Psychological Science, paper presented at the 109th Annual Convention of the
American Psychological Association, San Francisco (2001), described in Kovera et
al., supra note 76.
80. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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cated legal or policy questions using both similar and different re-
search methods. Finally, consumers of empirical research can master
the basic concepts of research methodology and specific debiasing
techniques that will enable them to engage in such a careful consider-
ation of policy relevant studies.
A. Explore the Tensions
Rather than either uncritically accepting the results of any single
study as reflecting an unambiguous "truth" about a legal setting or
rejecting the study out of hand, those evaluating empirical research
ought to self-consciously adopt the goal of careful consideration of the
methodological-legal issues. That is, evaluators should attempt to
identify the tensions and tradeoffs among empirical methods and the
law (such as those identified here) and carefully consider what a spe-
cific methodological choice means for the interpretation and applica-
tion of the research results. For example, consumers of the Nebraska
capital punishment study ought to ask themselves how they might ex-
pect the details of the culpability measure to affect the results. Con-
sumers of an experimental study of the effects of death-qualification
or comprehension of instructions using students as participants
should ask how using a different sample of participants would affect
the results. If a different measure of culpability or different partici-
pants were used, how likely is it that the results would be different?
Why? If differences are anticipated, of what magnitude and in what
direction are they expected to be? What implications might those dif-
ferences have for policymaking?
Decisionmakers ought to consider both the nature of the research
question being studied8l and the expected patterns of results. Of par-
ticular concern should not be expected differences in magnitude, but
differences in the patterns of effects obtained with different measures
or participant population (i.e., interactions between the variable of in-
terest and the method variable).8 2
81. See Diamond, supra note 30, at 564 ("A less-than-full-scale trial stimulus can also
provide a suitable vehicle if the research is designed to study decisionmaking
issues that are not dependent on the nature of the evidence being presented at
trial.").
82. See generally Bray & Kerr, supra note 30; Diamond, supra note 30, at 563 ("If
differences between student and general adult populations were confined to dif-
ferences in rates of conviction or willingness to find liability, and did not interact
with experimental manipulations, the choice of a subject population would not be
troubling."); Greene et al., supra note 2, at 253 (stating that, more important
than main effect differences, "there might be 'interactive' differences in the way
that students versus non-students . . . respond to experimental manipulations
.... The second difference is more worrisome than the first because it suggests
that factors associated with the methods used may limit the generalizability of
research findings based on experimental manipulations of variables."); Michael J.
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Consider the use of counting aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances as measures of culpability. It is plausible to expect that some
other measure of culpability would result in the same directional pat-
tern of results, but with effects of a somewhat different magnitude.
Though somewhat interesting, these types of differences may not have
widely divergent implications for policy. It would be more troubling if
we were to find different patterns of effects as a result of using differ-
ent culpability measures. For example, we might detect effects when
using one set of measures, but not when other measures are used.
Even more troubling might be a pattern of effects in which effects are
detected using both measures, but the effects are in opposite direc-
tions, a pattern which seems unlikely in the present instance.
8 3
In order to understand the implications of a study for law or policy,
the tensions between the method and the law need to be identified, the
alternative approaches specified, and an explicit theory articulated
about why, in what ways, and to what extent the tension is likely to
influence the results in ways that have implications for the policy or
law at issue. Because such tensions are inevitable, evaluators must
do more than superficially discount a piece of research because a ten-
sion exists or a tradeoff has been made (such will always be the case)
or ignore the tension or tradeoff and accept the results at face value.
Rather, evaluators must critically assess the nuances of the method-
ological choice and its implications for policy.
B. Research in Context
Not only must the tensions between empirical methodology and the
law be articulated and carefully considered in the context of a single
study, but, even more importantly, such tensions should be considered
in the context of a body of research as a whole. It is a widely held view
in social science that no single study will be dispositive of a research
Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Deci-
sions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 1 (1997).
83. See Robert M. Bray & Norbert L. Kerr, Methodological Considerations in the
Study of the Psychology of the Courtroom, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM
(Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982) for a typology of interaction pat-
terns. The same type of analysis can be conducted for differences between stu-
dent participants and jury-eligible community residents. Haney and Lynch self-
consciously considered the potential impact of various aspects of their methodol-
ogy on the generalizability of their research. For example, when using students
as participants in studies exploring comprehension of penalty phase instructions,
they considered how using a broader set of jury-eligible participants would be
likely to affect the results. They anticipated that using students would overesti-
mate comprehension of instructions, primarily because of their educational back-
ground. See Haney & Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death, supra note 34, at
418; Haney & Lynch, Clarifying Life and Death, supra note 34, at 577. In subse-
quent studies, they found that, indeed, using jury-eligible participants resulted in
even lower levels of comprehension. Lynch & Haney, supra note 34 at 338-39.
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question.8 4 Instead, researchers strive to conduct multiple studies in
an area using multiple methods, participant populations, approaches,
materials, and researchers. In doing so, researchers can maximize the
inherent advantages of divergent methodologies and minimize the in-
herent disadvantages of each as well. This is the concept of conver-
gent validity-using a number of approaches researchers hope to
converge (or triangulate) on an understanding or explanation of a phe-
nomenon. If archival studies can find an association between two
variables in real world cases and experimental studies can isolate that
effect in controlled settings, both using different participant popula-
tions, different trial materials, different measures, and so on, greater
confidence in the results is justified.
Thus, the experimental studies of death qualification effects should
be read in conjunction with other, related, studies in which similar
effects have been demonstrated in actual cases or in which connec-
tions have been made between attitudes about capital punishment
and other demographic and attitudinal differences between jurors.8 5
Experimental studies of juror comprehension of instructions should be
read in conjunction with interviews of jurors who have sat in capital
cases.8 6 Archival studies of decisionmaking in capital cases should be
read in the context of other archival studies as well as the experimen-
tal literature.8 7 Each study, by itself, is interesting, but it is when a
number of studies are read together that a more complete picture of
the phenomenon of interest is likely to emerge.
This suggests that it is incumbent upon scientists to strive to build
bodies of research that are interconnected using multiple methodolo-
gies and conducted by different researchers.8 8 While there will al-
84. See Edith Greene et al., supra note 2, at 247 ("[I]t is a rare individual study that
is able to address all of these issues. More importantly, it is not clear that individ-
ual studies should address every issue."); Michael J. Saks, Improving APA Sci-
ence Translation Amicus Briefs, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 235, 240 (1993) (noting
the "nearly universal consensus that a single study is not sufficient").
85. See, e.g., Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 33, at 39; Gary Moran & John C.
Comfort, Neither "Tentative" nor "Fragmentary:" Verdict Preference of Impaneled
Felony Jurors as a Function of Attitude Toward Capital Punishment, 71 J. AP-
PLIED PSYCHOL. 146, 152-54 (1986).
86. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 43; Craig Haney et al., Deciding to Take a
Life: Capital Juries, Sentencing Instructions, and the Jurisprudence of Death, 50
J. Soc. ISSUES 149 (1995); Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 43; A. Reifman et al.,
Real Jurors' Understanding of the Law in Real Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 539
(1992).
87. For similar studies in other jurisdictions see, for example., DAVID C. BALDUS ET
AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
(1990); David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in
the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings
from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998).
88. It is also incumbent on researchers to conduct well-conceived and executed re-
search. There is some evidence that biased assimilation might be tempered
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ways be instances in which legal or policy decisions must be made
without a well-developed body of research directly on point, that is not
always the case. Moreover, the research community can attempt to
anticipate the next important legal and policy issues and begin to
build programs of research around those issues.8 9 Policymakers, in
turn, ought to consider a particular study in the broader context of the
literature.
C. Methodological Training
Finally, as noted earlier, in order for members of the legal and pol-
icy community to engage in this process of self-consciously scrutiniz-
ing empirical research, they must have a basic background in
empirical research methodology. There is evidence that training in
statistics and research methodology does improve individuals' ability
to engage in statistical and methodological reasoning.90 In particular,
somewhat if the studies are difficult to challenge. See Rohini Ahluwalia, Exami-
nation of Psychological Processes Underlying Resistance to Persuasion, 27 J. CON-
SUMER RESEARCH 217, 222 (2000); Ditto et al., supra note 64, at 64. Munro and
Ditto found that, "in general, participants showed a good deal of sensitivity to the
methodological details of the scientific studies presented" and were "more con-
vinced by the methodologically detailed long descriptions." Munro & Ditto, supra
note 53, at 649. Pyszczynski and Greenberg argue that information processors
have the need to maintain an "illusion of objectivity." Tom Pyszczynski & Jeff
Greenberg, Toward an Integration of Cognitive and Motiviational Perspectives on
Social Inference: A Biased Hypothesis-Testing Model, 20 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMEN-
TAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 297, 302 (1987). Thus, "(j]udgments seem best characterized
as a compromise between the wish to reach a particular conclusion and the plau-
sibility of that conclusion given the available data." Ditto & Lopez, supra note 53,
at 569; see also Ditto et al., supra note 64, at 64; B. R. Sherman & A. Kunda,
Motivated Evaluation of Scientific Evidence, Paper presented at the American
Psychological Society Convention, Arlington, VA (June 1989), reported in Ziva
Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 490 (1990)
("Of importance is that all subjects were also quite responsive to the differential
strength of different aspects of the method, which suggests that they were
processing the evidence in depth. Threatened subjects did not deny that some
aspects were strong, but they did not consider them to be as strong as did non-
threatened subjects. The bias was constrained by plausibility."). Accordingly,
the stronger the evidence, the more difficult it is to reject it out of hand.
89. John Darley, Getting Ahead of the Curve: Anticipating Future Policy Needs in
Today's Research, 15 APS OBSERVER 5 (May/June 2002) (suggesting that psychol-
ogists "[tlake our task as 'getting ahead of the curve,' as identifying what issues
will require policy decisions in the next decade, and mobilizing research now to
make the discoveries around which polices eventually can be formed.").
90. See Geoffrey T. Fong et al., The Effect of Statistical Training on Thinking about
Everyday Problems, 18 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 253, 253 (1986); Richard P. Larrick
et al., Teaching the Use of Cost-Benefit Reasoning in Everyday Life, 1 PSYCHOL.
Sci. 362, 369 (1990); Richard P. Larrick et al., Who Uses the Cost-Benefit Rules of
Choice? Implications for the Normative Status of Microeconomic Theory, 56 ORGA-
NIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 331, 333 (1993); Lehman et al.,
supra note 72, at 431; Darrin R. Lehman & Richard E. Nisbett, A Longitudinal
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mechanisms as varied as undergraduate education in psychology and
the social sciences,91 graduate training in probabilistic sciences such
as psychology and medicine,92 individual statistics courses, 93 and
even relatively short, targeted training sessions9 4 have been shown to
improve individuals' ability to engage in statistical and methodologi-
cal reasoning.
Kovera and McAuliff found that judges with some scientific back-
ground properly judged a study with high internal validity as more
likely to be admissible than did judges with no science background. In
addition, they judged a flawed study (i.e., one that did not rule out an
alternative explanation) as less likely to be admissible than did judges
who did not have any background in scientific methods.95 However,
the judges did not differ in their assessments of versions of the study
with other methodological flaws.96
General training in methodology may be useful in helping legal
decisionmakers to identify flawed research. And certainly if one can-
not distinguish between well-done and unquestionably flawed re-
search, one is unlikely to be able to engage in the subtle examination
of studies that is suggested above. However, the focus here is prima-
rily on biased interpretation of well-done, but inherently imperfect re-
search, and it is less clear that such training will help to ameliorate
the effects of biased assimilation. Redding and Reppucci did not find
that judges' and law students' background in science had any moder-
ating influence on biased assimilation. 9 7 In addition, as described
above, a number of studies have found that even individuals who have
advanced training in science are susceptible to biased assimilation. 98
However, there are particular (and relatively straightforward)
strategies of reasoning that might be fruitfully taught or adopted by
evaluators of research. Research exploring the contours of the "biased
Study of the Effects of Undergraduate Training on Reasoning, 26 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 952, 959 (1990); Richard E. Nisbett et al., Teaching Reasoning, 238 Sci-
ENCE 625, 627-28 (1987).
91. Lehman & Nisbett, supra note 90, at 956. And to a somewhat lesser degree un-
dergraduate education in the natural sciences and the humanities. Id.
92. Lehman et al., supra note 72, at 437.
93. Fong et al., supra note 90, at 280.
94. Id.
95. Kovera & McAuliff, supra note 76, at 580. The Judges' backgrounds in science
were based on their undergraduate majors, their graduate science courses, CLEs
on scientific methods, and their familiarity with the Federal Judicial Center's
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence. Id. at 578.
96. Id. at 580 (missing control group or the use of research assistant who was not
blind to the hypotheses of the study).
97. Redding & Reppucci, supra note 54. Background in science was based on the
number of empirical social science courses taken, the number of natural science
courses taken, and the number of law and social science courses taken in law
school. Id. at 38.
98. Koehler, supra note 53; Mahoney, supra note 53.
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assimilation" phenomenon has suggested that in evaluating the meth-
odology of an empirical study, it may be useful to adopt a strategy of
"considering the opposite." That is, when considering an empirical
study, one ought to reflect on how one would have evaluated the
study, its methodology, and its persuasiveness if the results had come
out differently.
Lord, Lepper, and Preston tested two different mechanisms for
debiasing judgments of research quality using the same capital pun-
ishment materials as in the original Lord, Ross, and Lepper biased
assimilation study. 99 Participants in the debiasing conditions were
given either a set of instructions that told them to "be unbiased" by
trying to be as objective, fair, and impartial as possible or instructions
that directed them to "consider the opposite" by taking into account
"whether you would have made the same.., evaluations had exactly
the same study produced results on the other side of the issue."10 0 Re-
sults consistent with biased assimilation were obtained for partici-
pants who received instructions identical to those in the original study
and for those who received the "be unbiased" instructions; that is,
these participants' prior attitudes about the death penalty influenced
their evaluations of how well-done and how convincing the studies
were. However, this pattern was not found for participants who were
instructed to "consider the opposite"; that is, the evaluations of these
participants were not influenced by their prior attitudes on the
topic.101
These results suggest that correcting for biased assimilation is
more than merely a matter of good faith efforts to be fair and unbi-
ased. Accordingly, efforts to improve the impartiality of those called
to evaluate research are unlikely to be successful. Rather, it appears
that biased assimilation is the "result of inadequate cognitive strate-
gies."102 Thus, efforts might be more fruitfully directed so as "to pro-
mote an explicit consideration of alternative possibilities, especially
those possible outcomes that are diametrically opposed to those ex-
pected or perceived."103
There are open empirical questions as to how legal actors will re-
spond to more specific training in the scientific method, which types of
training are most effective with legal actors, and so on.104 Whether
99. See Lord et al., supra note 53.
100. Id. at 1233.
101. Id. at 1233-34.
102. Id. at 1239.
103. Id. at 1233.
104. For example, Kovera and McAuliff, supra note 76, at 578, included those with
undergraduate majors in the natural sciences as part of the group of judges char-
acterized as having some scientific background. However, Lehman et al., supra
note 72, at 437, found that graduate education in chemistry did not improve
methodological and statistical reasoning and Lehman and Nisbett, supra note 90,
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mechanisms such as reference materials dealing with methodological
issues, training sessions targeted at judges or legislators, law school
courses, or assistance by experts can improve the evaluation of social
science methods by legal and policy decisionmakers is empirically
testable. 05 But, certainly, there is no reason to believe that judges,
lawyers, and legislators cannot grasp the fundamentals of scientific
methodology and strategies such as consideration of the opposite re-
sults,1O6 and law schools as well as those engaged in policy relevant
scientific research ought to facilitate that mastery. 07
V. CONCLUSION
While I have focused my comments on the Nebraska study of capi-
tal punishment and other research on capital punishment decision-
making, these ideas are much more broadly applicable. Virtually any
empirical study that is relevant to law or policy will have relative ad-
vantages and disadvantages, and evaluations of the methodological
pros and cons can be colored by biased assimilation. Consumers of
such empirical research, whether it be on capital punishment or any
other legal or policy issue, should be encouraged to step back from
their prior beliefs to critically examine the implications of the re-
searchers' methodological choices for any conclusions that might be
drawn. Rather than uncritically accepting the results of any study or
rejecting them out of hand, policy and legal decisionmakers ought to
learn to think deeply about the implications of a study's methods in
the broader context of empirical work.
at 956, found that improvements in methodological reasoning were greater for
psychology and social science students than for students in the natural sciences
and humanities.
105. See, e.g., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC Evi-
DENCE (2d ed. 2000); FAIGMAN, supra note 8, at 200 (noting training programs by
the Federal Judicial Center, the National Judicial College, and the Private Adju-
dication Center at Duke University).
106. FAIGMAN, supra note 8, at 64 (noting that most judges are intelligent and well-
educated).
107. See Epstein & King, supra note 9; Heise, supra note 71, at 815. For a casebook
addressing these issues in detail see generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE
IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS, AND RESEARCH ISSUES (2002); see also Shari
Seidman Diamond, Using Psychology to Control Law: From Deceptive Advertising
to Criminal Sentencing, 13 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 239, 251 (1989) ("It is up to us to
see that the judiciary and other actors in the legal system come to understand the
meaning and policy implications of social scientific research. If we do not work to
educate legal decision makers so they can distinguish between good research and
bad, we cannot complain when courts or legislatures give credence to misleading
data or reject our own impeccable research findings.").
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